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Anticipated Status Decline for Locals Entering Global Employment Markets

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This work was supported by grants from the Emirates Foundation, the Harvard Kennedy School Women and Public Policy Program, the Harvard Kennedy School Center for Public Leadership, and the Harvard University Middle East Initiative. We also thank the Gender and Public Policy Program at the Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government for their logistical and administrative support of our data collection in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. We gratefully acknowledge generous feedback on this manuscript from Linda Babcock, Frank Flynn, Michele Gelfand, and Ying Yi Hong. We owe special thanks for the research assistance of Maimoona Al-Bahandy, Amira Al-Hefaiti, Christine Assaad, Ghalia Gargani, Asmaa Ramadan, and Huda Sajwani.

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Abstract

Qualitative research on multi-national work life has begun to illuminate how status hierarchies emerge and are maintained between workers more closely aligned with the dominant global business culture (e.g., Anglo-Americans) and those attempting to assimilate from other cultural backgrounds. In two studies, we compare the psychological experience of global and national job markets for university students from a rapidly globalizing emerging market. We recruited study participants from national universities in the Arab Gulf in which students are trained in English for work in global business markets. Negatively stereotyped as “lazy locals” in the Western-dominated global work culture, we find that male nationals feel more reticent to negotiate for career rewards (viz., compensation) in a global (versus local) business context (Study 1) and that they are more negatively evaluated by their peers for attempting to negotiate for higher pay in a global (vs. local) business context. Replicating U.S. studies, in the local business context we find that female (versus male) nationals feel more reticent to negotiate for higher pay (Study 1) and are more negatively evaluated when they do (Study 2). There were no gender differences in the propensity to negotiate or in the evaluation of negotiators in the global work context. In Study 2, mediation analyses support the proposition that, for male nationals in the global work culture, negotiating for higher compensation violates prescriptions of low-status behavior (viz., communality). Evaluators penalize female negotiators for a lack of communality, but also for perceived immodesty and materialism. We discuss implications for the study of global-local status hierarchies in multi-national employment contexts.

Keywords: global-local work culture, globalization, gender, negotiation, status, stereotypes
Anticipated Status Decline for Locals Entering the Global Employment Markets

“When I go for an interview, the first impression they have is that I am a local. I am lazy... This is the stereotype.”

Emirati university graduate applying for work with a multi-national corporation

Within the global labor market, there exists a social hierarchy of employees, which elevates those associated with “global” business culture above those associated “local” business cultures (Freeman, 2001; Gillespie, McBride, & Riddle, 2010; Hong, Wan, No, & Chiu, 2007). Global business culture is characterized by contemporary Western capitalist values and logics (e.g., individualistic, analytic, competitive, performance driven). It stands in contrast to traditional, non-Western local business cultures, which tend to be associated with relationship-oriented and historically determined business practices (Erez & Shokef, 2008; Fu & Chiu, 2007; Hong et al., 2007; Sanchez-Burks & Lee, 2007).

The prototypic ideal worker of the global market culture is the Euro-American businessman (Acker, 2004; Connell, 1998; Freeman, 2001; Hong et al., 2007; Tomlinson, 1999). This cultural prototype creates two implicit hierarchies. One is between men and women, because gendered behavioral norms constrain women’s fulfillment of this masculine ideal (Acker, 2004; Freeman, 2001). The other is between Western men who, by stereotype, (more closely) resemble the cultural prototype and non-Western men who, by stereotype, fall short of it (Connell, 1998; Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005).

Status beliefs are spread and reinforced through two primary mechanisms: the endowment and dissemination of material wealth and social interaction (Ridgeway, 2001; Ridgeway, Boyle, Kuipers, & Robinson, 1998; Ridgeway & Erickson, 2000). Recent qualitative research in multinational corporations has illuminated how micro behaviors in social interaction (e.g., displays of deference or disregard) reinforce Western, particularly Anglo-American, dominance in the hierarchy of global employees. For instance, Metiu (2006) conducted an ethnographic study of a cross-national software development team located on the West Coast of the United States and Bangalore, India. She documented how Americans
distanced themselves from their Indian colleagues by making claim to creative (vs. lower-status technical) work and by segregating online communications as well as face-to-face social interactions. In another qualitative study, Neeley (2013) studied the transition to English as the lingua franca in a European multinational corporation. She documented how the gradual withdrawal of less fluent English speakers from social interaction contributed their decline in professional status.

These studies bring to light the maintenance and creation of status asymmetries within multinational corporations. In our research, we focused on the perspective of prospective job candidates in emerging markets. Through the lens of an employment negotiation, we aimed to test whether national/local job candidates experience a psychological decline in status contemplating employment in a multinational/global (as compared to national/local) business culture.

**Negotiation as a Micromechanism of Inequality**

Negotiation is one of the fundamental social processes in organizational life (Barley, 1991; DeDreu & Gelfand, 2007; Graham, 1995; Katz & Kahn, 1966; Pfeffer, 1981). It is an essential mechanism in the coordination of work and a vehicle for career advancement. However, it is not a social process that is equally accessible to all employees. Organizational researchers have long suggested that the social identity of the employee influences the outcomes of implicit negotiation processes that affect career advancement, such that employees belonging to higher status social groups (e.g., male versus female or majority versus minority employees) are more successful at attaining organizational resources and opportunities (Brass, 1985; Dreher & Cox Jr, 2000; Dreher & Cox, 1996; Miller, Lincoln, & Olson, 1981). Unfortunately, due to the nature of the data collected, the micro-mechanisms underlying these inequitable outcomes are typically obscured (Reskin, 2003).

More recently, psychological research on gender in negotiation has provided a window into the micro-processes of gender inequality in organizations (Bowles & McGinn, 2008). U.S.-based field and laboratory studies indicate that men feel at greater liberty than women to negotiate for career rewards, such as higher compensation (Babcock, Gelfand, Small, & Stayn, 2006; Babcock & Laschever, 2003;
Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 2007), and that this is because women fear social backlash when they make claims to higher pay (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007).

In this research, we study how negotiation could function as a micromechanism of inequality for men as well as women in globalizing work contexts. We focus in particular on how the shift from high social status in a local business culture to lower status in a global business culture inhibits male “locals” negotiating behavior. In order to explain what is distinctive to the experiences of men as compared to women, we also test for differential gender effects across these contexts.

**Job Markets in the “Global Heartbeat of the Middle East”**

In order to study the psychological experience of shifting between local and global business cultures, we located our research in the Arab Gulf, a region known as the “global heartbeat of the Middle East” (Hudson, 2006, p. 148). Sparked by oil discoveries in the mid-twentieth century, economic globalization in the Arab Gulf has had a transformative influence on what were once small traditional societies (Khalaf, 2002). In just a few decades, the Arab Gulf has become a global center of trade and commerce—exhibiting the latest in technology and infrastructure, with large ports, hubs for tourism and retail, and high volume flows of capital and people. The population of the Gulf has increased tenfold since the 1950s—the most rapid population growth rate globally in the late twentieth century (Forstenlechner & Rutledge, 2010). Today in all Gulf countries, nationals have full command of the government sector but are minorities in their private-sector workforces (Arab Labor Organization, 2010).

**Gender Hierarchy in Local Employment**

In the Arab Gulf countries in which we conducted our research—Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), men retain overwhelming control of economic resources and authority positions in government and the domestic private sector (Hausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi, 2009). In spite of university graduation rates for women that rival men’s, women occupy only a fraction of the workforce—less than 15 percent in Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Livani, 2007). Within Arab Gulf cultures, men are the presumed breadwinners for the family, and women are expected to assume family career-giving roles (AlMunajjed, 1997; Metle, 2002). The women who are employed work mostly in gender-segregated departments of the
public sector or in lower-level positions in the private sector (Metcalf, 2006; Norton et al., 1997).

As in other parts of the world, the larger social structure of gender relations seeps into the local work culture, undermining women’s status relative to men and constraining their workplace behavior (Eagly & Carli, 2007; Heilman, 1983; Metcalfe, 2006, 2007, 2008; Metle, 2002; Ridgeway, 2006; Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004). Gendered behavioral norms (e.g., gender roles [Eagly, 1987]; prescriptive gender stereotypes [Rudman & Glick, 2001]) stem from men’s and women’s respective place in the society (Burgess & Borgida, 1999; Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Jackman, 1994; Rudman & Glick, 2008). Because men tend to be in charge, they are expected to act like they are in charge and to behave in an agentic manner. Because women tend to be in care-giving and support roles, they are expected to behave in a more communal, deferential manner (Eagly & Carli, 2007; Glick et al., 2000; Metcalfe, 2006).

Negotiating for higher pay for oneself is the type of self-promoting, stereotypically agentic behavior that violates prescriptive feminine stereotypes (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 2007; Rudman, 1998). We predict, therefore, that gender effects on compensation negotiations in the local work culture of the Arab Gulf will replicate the pattern of effects observed in U.S. studies, such that women are more reticent than men to negotiate for higher compensation and they are penalized more harshly than men when they do. Specifically, U.S. researchers have found that evaluators report being less willing to work with women who negotiate (as compared to those who let the opportunity to negotiate pass) (Bowles et al., 2007). We predict a replication of these effects in the local work culture.

In U.S. studies, evaluators report that they are less willing to work with women who negotiate (versus not) for higher compensation because that type of self-advocacy violates norms of communal behavior (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 2007). Communality (i.e., care and concern for others) is a central component of the feminine stereotype across a broad range of cultural contexts (Best & Thomas, 2004; Eagly, 1987; Glick et al., 2000; Schein, 2001; Williams & Best, 1982). We predict that evaluators will be disinclined to work with women who negotiate for higher pay in the local work culture because they will perceive them as insufficiently communal (viz., lacking in concern for others).

Within the specific cultural context of the Arab Gulf, we predict that evaluators will also be
disinclined to work with women who negotiate for higher compensation because of perceived immodesty and materialism. Modesty is a primary prescriptive stereotype for Arab women (Abu-Lughod, 1998; Haddad & Esposito, 1998), which carries over into the workplace—particularly in gender-mixed work environments (Metcalfe, 2006). We hypothesize that negotiating for greater compensation violates modesty norms for women in a work context. We hypothesize that women who negotiate for higher pay will also appear materialistic because the male breadwinner model is so deeply institutionalized in labor market structures and employment policies (Metcalfe, 2007) that women’s earnings are presumed for personal consumption (AlMunajjed, 1997; Metle, 2002; Saliba, Allen, & Howard, 2002).

**Global-Local Male Hierarchy**

While male nationals have high social status relative to women in the local work culture, their status is challenged in the global work culture. In recent decades, the pace of economic development and globalization in the Gulf States grossly outstripped the local labor supply—both in terms of the quantity of people needed to do the work and in terms of the quality of employee (e.g., skills, education, experience, etc.) demanded by global employers. To fill private-sector labor demand, rapidly globalizing Gulf countries instituted *laissez-faire* expatriate employment policies, targeting both “guest workers” to fill undesirable low-level positions and Western-educated, skilled labor to diversify their economies (Forstenlechner & Rutledge, 2010; Harry, 2007; Hvidt, 2011). In countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, foreign workers now occupy more than 80 percent of private-sector jobs (Arab Labor Organization, 2010). The lingua franca of the private sector is English, not Arabic. The minority amidst an immigrant majority, it is now the Gulf nationals who have to adapt to and integrate themselves within the new global work culture in the Arab Gulf (Al-Ali, 2008; Al-Waqfi & Forstenlechner, 2010; Ramady, 2005).

In order to prepare young nationals for positions within the private sector, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have created “reform universities” with English-mandated instruction (selected in Saudi Arabia; nationally instituted in the UAE). The primary purpose of the reform universities is to acculturate students to the norms and practices of global business world. Most reform universities advertise U.S. accreditation because it signals an authentically “global” educational experience. Their mission statements proclaim
commitments to preparing graduates to compete in the global economy.

As discussed in great depth below, students graduate from these reform universities as global-local biculturals (Arnett, 2002). They are bilingual English-and-native-Arabic-speaking Gulf nationals. They are natives of the “local” culture, who are also fluent in the “global” language of business (i.e., English) and its “workways” (i.e., the “culture’s signature pattern of workplace beliefs, mental models, and practices that embody a society’s ideas about what is true, good, and efficient within the domain of work,” Sanchez-Burks & Lee, 2007, p. 346).

However, in spite of these educational investments, perceptions of national university graduates still fall short of the ideal global worker and stymie efforts to integrate nationals into the private-sector economy (Abdulla, 2010; Al-Waqfi & Forstenlechner, 2010; Forstenlechner & Mellahi, in press; Forstenlechner & Rutledge, 2010). Research and new coverage on the employment of nationals in the private sector (aka, “nationalization”) document the widespread stereotyping of nationals as lacking in work ethic and the skills and competencies needed for globally competitive enterprise (Forstenlechner, Madi, Selim, & Rutledge, 2012; Mellahi, 2007). The opening quote of the paper illustrates how national job candidates for global work experience this stereotype.

Negatively stereotyped as less valuable employees, we argue that the social status of male nationals declines moving from the local to the global work culture. Because of this status decline, we predict that male nationals will feel more reticent to negotiate for higher pay in the global than local work culture. We also predict that they will be penalized more harshly in the global than local work culture when they negotiate for higher compensation.

We hypothesize that a perceived lack of communality (viz., lack of perceived concern for others) will explain harsher evaluations of local male negotiators in the global than local context. Communality is an ascribed and prescribed trait for lower-status groups members in general—not only women (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Conway, Pizzamiglio, & Mount, 1996; Eagly, 1987; Jackman, 1994; Meeker & Weitzel-O’Neill, 1977; Ridgeway, 2001). For instance, Jackman (1994) documented similarities in the communal traits prescribed for women and African American slaves in U.S. history in order reinforce White men’s
social status. Conway et al. (1996) demonstrated experimentally that even fictional low-status groups are ascribed communal traits and high-status groups agentic ones. In sum, we argue that the negotiating behavior of male nationals will be more constrained in the global (versus local) work culture because making claims to career rewards, such as compensation, violates the prescriptions of low-status behavior.

We did not predict any significant shifts in the social constraints on female nationals’ negotiating behavior in the global as compared to local work context. Both the local and global work cultures are male dominated. We did not predict a double main effect for being female and a local in a global (vs. local) business because interviews and press coverage about the job market for university graduates in the Gulf suggested that the “lazy local” stereotype tends to be more strongly associated with male more than female nationals. This may simply be because most national job candidates for global management positions are male. However, there were also suggestions—as in other emerging economies (e.g., case of Indian call workers, Holman, Batt, & Holtgrewe, 2007; Jensen, 2012)—that global employers actually prefer to hire female over male locals in certain types of roles. The following quote from a focus group we conducted with female Emirati university students is representative of this impression that global corporations favor hiring female nationals:

Every time I passed by an office, I was surprised to find that it was filled with women.

Most employees were women. So I asked the HR manager why are the all the office employees female? His answer was, ‘Because I had employed males, and they didn’t adhere to the working hours and they weren’t the type that liked office work.’ That’s why he had to employee females because they are punctual and the work they do is done better than males.

Finally, there is some case-based evidence to suggest that global business trends promoting female talent might bolster the workplace status of Arab women and increase their perceived competitiveness relative to their male peers (Metcalf, 2006, 2007).

**Overview of Studies**

We started with a pretest to affirm that there is a generally held perception among Gulf nationals
that their male university graduates are more negatively stereotyped as workers by global than local employers. We then conducted mirror negotiation studies, capturing both the negotiator’s and evaluator’s perspectives on a potential negotiation for higher compensation. Participants were global-local bi-cultural national university students. In Study 1, we primed either the global or local work culture, and then tested whether national women would feel more reluctant than national men to negotiate in the local work culture and whether national men would feel more reluctant to negotiate in the global than local work culture. In Study 2, we reversed the scenario so that participants evaluated the potential negotiator. We primed global or local work culture and manipulated employee gender and whether the employee negotiated. We tested whether participants would penalize national women more than national men for negotiating in the local work culture and whether they would penalize national men more for negotiating in the global (versus local) work culture—affirming the patterns of reticence to negotiate in Study 1. In all studies, we included male and female nationals as participants and targets in order to test for replication of U.S. gender effects and to distinguish phenomena that apply to male nationals specifically.

**Pretest of “Lazy Local” Stereotype**

Previous research has shown that Gulf nationals are negatively stereotyped as workers by expatriate employers (Al-Waqfi & Forstenlechner, 2010). However, for the purposes of our research, we wanted to establish that there is a belief among Gulf nationals that their male university graduates, in particular, are devalued as employees in the global (vs. local) work context. A market-research company recruited 105 university-educated Emiratis with work experience to complete an online survey in Arabic on perceptions of Emirati university graduates on the job market (38 men, 67 women; M work experience = 7 years). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (Graduate Gender: Male/Female) × 2 (Global/Local Work Context) between-subjects design. We manipulated work context by referring to prospective employers as “local” or “global” companies with corresponding national or international flags in the survey header. We manipulated graduate gender with gendered nouns, adjectives, and pronouns. The survey asked participants’ opinions “about the views that employers in [global/local] companies typically hold about [male/female] Emirati university graduates seeking work in
Participants rated perceptions on seven criteria (ambitious, capable, competent, knowledgeable, reliable, respected, skillful), which we reverse coded and combined in a mean composite of the “lazy local” stereotype ($\alpha = .94$). ANOVA revealed an interaction of Gender $\times$ Global/Local, $F(1, 101) = 6.90$, $p = .01$, $\eta^2 = .06$. No other effects were significant, $F$s $< 2.08$, $ps > .15$. As anticipated, participants rated male graduates higher on the lazy-local stereotype in the global (versus local) work culture (global $M = 5.13$, $SD = 1.04$; local $M = 4.33$, $SD = 1.07$; $t[49] = 2.67$, $p = .01$, $d = .76$), but not female (global $M = 4.40$, $SD = 0.90$; local $M = 4.63$, $SD = 0.91$; $t[52] = 0.91$, $p = .37$, $d = .25$).

**Study 1**

Study 1 was a 2 (Participant Gender) $\times$ 2 (Global/Local Work Culture) between-subjects design. We tested our culture manipulation and our hypotheses with regard to the effects of gender and global/local work culture on the propensity to negotiate for higher compensation.

**Priming Culture**

In Studies 1 and 2, our participants were bilingual native-Arabic-plus-English speaking university students enrolled in the above-described reform universities *qua* training grounds for the global labor market. These are young people who inhabit the boundary of the global and local on a daily basis. They are global-local biculturals (Arnett, 2002)—“locals” acculturated to the workways of the global market through immersion in its language, practices, and values.

Psychological research in the dynamic constructivist tradition shows that people immersed in multiple cultures (e.g., Chinese-American immigrants, Hong Kong Chinese) engage in cultural “frame switching” in which they see themselves and the social context through different cultural lenses contingent on cues in the social environment (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000). Ethnographies from the Muslim world similarly describe how the meeting of Western and traditional cultures creates “cultural dualities…between which individuals shift so smoothly…they do not notice themselves doing so” (Gregg, 2007, p. 49).

One demonstrated trigger of cultural frame switching is language (Chen & Bond, 2007; Hong et al., 2000). For example, one study found that Chinese-born Canadians described themselves as more
collectivist and espoused more Chinese values when responding to a survey in Chinese versus English (Ross, Xun, & Wilson, 2002). Because English is the lingua franca of international business in the Arab Gulf and local business is conducted in Arabic, we hypothesized that we could prime in a global versus local work culture using English- versus Arabic-language experimental materials (e.g., description of work scenario, survey questions).

**Focus groups.** Before designing our materials, we conducted a series of focus groups with university students to affirm that the students themselves associated English (versus Arabic) language use with global (versus local) business cultures. This was especially important because English has been found to evoke a range of associations depending on the context (Oyserman & Lee 2007). For instance, it might simply evoke “foreign” or “second” language (Kemmelmeier & Cheng, 2004; Ross et al., 2002) or something more political like the language of colonizer (Yang & Bond, 1980).

Followed norms for the use of focus groups in scholarly research (Morgan, 1996), we held a total four focus groups in the male and female sections of reform university campuses in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Each focus group included 8-12 bilingual undergraduate students with experience interviewing for work in the private sector. The median age was 20 years ($Min = 19, Max = 21$). The focus-group discussions were 1-2 hours long. In all groups, we asked questions about whether they identified with both local and global cultures and about Arabic and English as signifiers of local and global cultures. We recorded, transcribed, and content analyzed all of the conversations. Transcripts were 40-60 pages each and included rich narratives in both English and Arabic.

Participants in the focus groups tended to positively identify with the global business culture as well as with their national/local culture. Participants described “global culture” as associated with competition, individualism, and materialism. As reflected in the following dialogue, participants expressed clear associations with English as the language of international business and Arabic as the language of national cultural connection:

Participant 1: You talk about you CV, your skills; I prefer to speak in English…
Participant 2: But, like, the breaking the ice words [with another national], I think it would be in Arabic…

Participant 4: …Actually all the terminology we are taking here as business students are in English. We were speaking once…and I forgot what competition means in Arabic. It’s معافسة [munafasa = competition] I know now, but I completely forgot it. I never said مكافسة [munafasa = competition] here at the university.

The focus groups participants also described language as a carrier of culture and a proxy for identity. Two representative quotes in this vein, are “identity to any society is language” and “Language. It’s your identity, without it you’re nothing.” Participants described how English is associated with their expression of their global business identity and Arabic is associated with their expression of their local identity. The following quote illustrates speaking English as a signal of global business competence:

If a [non-national] client approaches me, for example, and…I speak to him in English in a nice manner and impress him, he will keep coming back to me when he has another transaction. That will surely…benefit me, and give me status at my work.

In sum, the focus groups reinforced for us the proposition that our sample of students from reform universities would self-identify as global-local bi-culturals and associate English with their global cultural identification and Arabic with their national/local cultural identifications.

**Hypotheses**

In Study 1, we tested experimentally whether English/Arabic language primes would activate global/local work culture identification by measuring whether participants reported a stronger globalized and Western self-construal and weaker identification with local work norms in the English-language condition. We theorized that the activation of participants’ context-specific cultural knowledge would also include awareness of social hierarchies between national men and women and for national men across local and global work contexts. We hypothesized that knowledge of these status-linked stereotypes would inform participants’ perceptions of the appropriateness of negotiating for higher
compensation in the local and global work cultures. Specifically, we predicted that female nationals would feel more reticent than male nationals to negotiate for higher compensation in the local work culture and that male nationals would feel more reticent to negotiate in the global than local work culture.

**Method**

**Participants.** In Study 1, participants were 157 Saudi nationals who were full-time students in the men’s and women’s colleges of two different Saudi Arabian reform universities (79 men, 78 women; \( M \) age = 21.79 years). (There were no statistically significant effects for university so we pooled the data.) We gained the permission of university administrators and classroom faculty to recruit students to complete an “Interview Situation Survey” during class time. All experimenters administering the surveys were Saudi nationals. Participants were randomly assigned to complete the survey in English or Arabic.

**Materials.** We developed the materials for Studies 1 and 2 starting with American job negotiation scenarios (from Bowles et al., 2007). We adapted the U.S. materials to fit the global and local work cultures of the Arab Gulf using qualitative data that we collected from focus groups and interviews with university students, graduates, and administrators about reform university education and the job market for university graduates. In Study 1, participants read a two-part scenario. Part 1 involved imagining they were interviewing for a desirable position at a company in Saudi Arabia. Part 2 was about receiving an offer from the company and entering an interview about a management placement. The job placement interview creates an opportunity to negotiate for higher compensation to match a competing offer.¹ See below the English-language description of the negotiation opportunity:

> … The position The Company is offering is one that you would like to take, but the compensation offer is lower than your next best offer from a less prestigious firm. You would like to accept the offer from The Company, but you are hoping that they will match the salary and bonus offer you received from the less prestigious firm. You have decided to ask the head of the department into which you are being hired—this is the same person with whom you interviewed—if The Company would consider raising your compensation to match your other offer.
The scenario in Study 1 and negotiation script in Study 2 included outside-offer information because interviewees emphasized that compensation negotiations were normative only if one had an outside offer. We pretested this scenario in an online survey in English with 23 Emirati professional students ($M_{age} = 33.35$ years) who rated how an outside offer would influence their evaluation of a gender-ambiguous employee (worse-to-better 7-point scales). The outside offer significantly improved survey respondents’ general impression of the employee ($M$ difference from mid-point = 0.78, $t_{[22]} = 3.12, p < .01$), but had no effect on their willingness to work with or hire the employee ($M$ difference from mid-point < 0.31, $ps > .29$). Because we predicted negotiation would be inhibiting (Study 1) or negatively affect employee evaluations (Study 2), we concluded the outside-offer information would only make our tests more conservative while enhancing ecological validity.

**Language manipulation.** In Studies 1 and 2, we translated the materials using a combination of the committee approach and translation-back-translation (van de Vijver, 2001). Three bilingual committee members with expertise in psychology, linguistics, and Gulf culture translated the materials from English into Arabic. A fourth independent translator converted the Arabic draft back into English as a final consistency check between the English and Arabic versions. The committee resolved minor discrepancies between the original English draft and the back-translated version.

**Procedure.** Participants were presented with stapled sheets of paper containing a consent form and the scenario and survey questions. These experimental materials were either in English or in Arabic. Participants were asked to complete the materials sequentially from start to finish. After reading each part of the scenario (described above), participants recorded how they would feel, what they would think, and what they imagined they would say in this situation. After Part 1, participants answered a set of items about expected work norms (i.e., the *wasta* items described below in Manipulation-check section). At the end of the survey, participants completed the self-concept items (i.e., *globalized* and *self-construal* items described below in Manipulation-check section) and language-proficiency and demographic questions.

**Manipulation check.** We used three sets of measures to test whether English (versus Arabic) language activated global (versus local) cultural frames. We used a single-item measure of self-
identification as “globalized” (5-point scale: “I consider myself a globalized Saudi…”). We created two four-item mean-composites of independent self-construal (7-point scale, example: “I am unique, separate from others;” α = .75) and interdependent self construal (7-point scale, example: “I think of myself as connected to the students in my university;” α = .82) (adapted from Harb & Smith, 2008, a measure validated in the Arab world). A more Western self-construal would be more independent and less interdependent (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Finally, we created an “emic” (i.e., culture specific) indicator of the activation of local (versus global) work norms based on the Arabic notion of “wasta.” Similar to “Guanxi” in Chinese, wasta refers to social connections that help one attain resources and opportunities. Wasta was a four-item mean composite (7-point scale, example: “I would need the recommendation of a wasta in this situation;” α = .88). (See Appendix for wasta items.) Two language-proficiency questions asked about comfort speaking in Arabic and in English (5-point scales).

**Dependent measure.** To discern the participants’ propensity to negotiate, two bilingual research assistants who were blind to the hypotheses coded the participants’ responses to Part 2 of the survey scenario (Inter-rater reliability = .89). As described above, Part 2 of the survey presented an opportunity to negotiate in a job placement interview. Participants were prompted to, “Describe your feelings and thoughts as you take your seat and are about to ask for higher compensation.” This open-ended format enabled the participants to express their thoughts and emotions in their own words. Writing as well as reading also reinforces the strength of a language prime (Kemmelmeier & Cheng, 2004). The research assistants coded participants’ responses in terms of their propensity to negotiate on a 3-point scale: 1 = weak (e.g., “I will not ask for higher compensation…” or “I would be extremely nervous & worried”), 2 = moderate (e.g., “I would feel a little bit hesitance, but put on a strong and confident face…” or “I would try to reinforce my confidence in myself and remind myself…it’s the professional thing to do”), 3 = strong (e.g., “I will feel excited because I already got the job and…I’ve got nothing to lose” or “I feel confident about my ability & that I deserve it”)

**Results and Discussion**

**Language proficiency.** There were no gender differences in self-reported language proficiency,
ts(155) < 1.36, ps > .17; Arabic M = 4.39, SD = .83; English M = 3.97, SD = .89.

**Activation of global/local work culture.** Consistent with the activation of a global (versus local) work culture, participants who completed the survey in English (versus Arabic) self-described as significantly more globalized (global M = 4.33, SD = .84, local M = 3.70, SD = 1.23, t(154) = 3.56, p < .001, d = .57), construed themselves as more independent (global M = 6.11, SD = .97; local M = 5.53, SD = 1.51, t(155) = 2.67, p < .008, d = .43) and less interdependent (global M = 3.94, SD = 1.22; local M = 4.44, SD = 1.29; t(155) = 2.44, p = .02, d = .39), and agreed less strongly with the need for wasta (global M = 3.32, SD = 1.86; local M = 3.90, SD = 1.73; t(155) = 2.00, p < .05, d = .32). Gender did not moderate these effects, Fs(1, 153) < 1.32, p > .25.

**Dependent measure: Propensity to negotiate.** Figure 1 summarizes effects of participant gender and global/local work culture on the propensity to negotiate for higher compensation. ANOVA of the propensity to negotiate showed no main effect for participant gender, F(1, 153) = 0.37, p = .54, η² < .01, but a significant main effect for global/local work culture, F(1, 153) = 29.08, p < .001, η² = .16. Participants were significantly less inclined to negotiate in the global than local cultural context (M difference = -0.59, t(155) = 5.38, p < .001, d = .86). Based on interviews about the job market for university graduates in the region, we interpret this main effect of context to reflect participants’ stronger job prospects in the local market. Although it seems possible that negotiating for higher compensation is more normative in general in the local than global cultural context, this interpretation would contradict interviewees’ characterizations of the two job markets and substantial cross-cultural research indicating that Western negotiating norms tend to be more (not less) competitively oriented toward individual economic gains than non-Western (Gelfand, Erez, & Aycan, 2007)—particularly for men as compared to women (Kray & Thompson, 2004).

As hypothesized, we also observed a significant interaction of Gender × Global/Local, F(1, 153) = 4.87, p < .03, η² = .03. As predicted for the local work culture, male participants felt significantly more inclined than female participants to negotiate, M difference = -0.31, t(92) = 2.53, p = .01, d = .53. But this gender effect did not extend to the global work culture, M difference = -0.17, t(61) = 0.89, p = .38, d =
As hypothesized, male participants felt significantly less inclined to negotiate in the global than local work culture, \( M_{\text{difference}} = -0.83, t(77) = 6.39, p < .001, d = 1.46 \). Female participants were also less inclined to negotiate in the global than local culture (\( M_{\text{difference}} = -0.35, t(76) = 1.96, p = .05, d = .45 \)), but the effect size for the male participants was three times larger.

The results of Study 1 supported the prediction that activating the global (versus local) work culture would inhibit the negotiating behavior of male (more than female) nationals. The observed decline in men’s (more than women’s) propensity to negotiate is consistent with a psychological experience of disempowerment shifting from the local to the global work culture (Magee, Galinsky, & Gruenfeld, 2007), but the results of Study 1 do not explain this effect.

In Study 2, we tested the proposition that male nationals perceive a social motivation to be more reticent to negotiate for higher compensation in the global than local cultural context because there is a greater social cost associated with negotiating in the global than local cultural context. In Study 2, we tested further whether the social costs for male nationals negotiating for pay in the global work culture would be explained by a perceived failure to act in a sufficiently communal (i.e., stereotypically low-status) manner. For female nationals, we predicted there would be a social cost associated with negotiating in the local and global work cultures (because both are male dominated), but evaluators would penalize female negotiators for perceived immodesty and materialism as well as a lack of communality.

**Study 2**

Study 2 was a 2 (Employee Gender: Male/Female) \( \times \) 2 (Global/Local Work Culture) \( \times \) 2 (Negotiate: Yes/No) between-subjects design. We reversed the perspective on the negotiation scenario employed in Study 1, so that participants were now evaluating the behavior of a male or female national who negotiated or not in the context of a placement interview for a new management position. We used the evaluations of the male and female nationals in the no-negotiate condition as a baseline against which to compare the effect of negotiating. We measured the social cost of negotiating for higher compensation in terms of the difference between evaluators’ willingness to work with employees in the no-negotiate as compared to negotiate condition.
Method

Participants. Participants were 393 Emirati nationals who were full-time students from three different national universities (125 male, 268 female; $M$ age = 21.05). (There were no statistically significant effects for university so we pooled the data.) With the permission of university administrators and classroom faculty, we recruited students to complete a “Job Interview Survey” during class time. The experimenter administering the survey was always a Gulf national. The experimenters randomly assigned participants to complete one of the eight versions of the survey.

Procedure. Participants completed a pen-and-paper survey in which they read an interview transcript, answered questions about their impression of the interviewee, and completed an exit survey with manipulation checks and demographic items. The entire survey was either in Arabic or English.

Materials. The interview situation and evaluation survey (adapted from Bowles et al., 2007) was the mirror image of materials used in Study 1. Participants evaluated a national university graduate with a traditional Emirati name (“the employee”) based on his/her behavior in a placement interview for a management position. The employee responds to two questions about work experience and management training, and then the interviewer asks, “Do you have any questions about your compensation and benefits package?” In the no-negotiate condition, the employee lets this opportunity to negotiate pass. In the negotiate condition, the employee responds by negotiating for higher pay:

“I do have some questions with regard to the salary and benefits package, though. I was approached by another company last week and they made me an offer for a management position. They are willing to pay me a higher salary than I would make here, plus a bonus. It wasn’t clear to me whether this salary offer represents the top of the pay range. I understand that there’s a range in terms of how much managers are paid in their first placement. I would like to be paid toward the top of that range. I would also like to be eligible for an end-of-year bonus.”

We manipulated employee gender using stereotypically masculine or feminine Emirati names (Hamad/Hamda) and gendered language (e.g., “he,” “she”) to describe the employee. We chose names
that were not affiliated with a particular emirate, tribe, or social class. As in Study 1, we primed global/local work culture using English/Arabic-language materials.

**Measures.** Participants rated their agreement on 7-point scales with randomly ordered statements about the impression created by the employee in the interview transcript. (See Appendix for all items included in these impression measures.) These items comprised our mediator variables. Five statements related to how *communal* the employee seemed (e.g., “puts people first”) (α = .71). In the creation of items for the communal construct, we focused on concerns for organizational relationships as our indicator of communality. While communality is a broader construct, concern for relationships in central to the communal stereotype (Bakan, 1966; Eagly, 1987) and has ecological validity in the context of job placement interview. Five statements related how *immodest* the employee seemed (e.g., “acted in an immodest manner”) (α = .73). Five statements related how *materialistic* the employee seemed (e.g., “is materialistic”) (α = .70). Our dependent measure was the willingness to work with the employee (adapted from Bowles et al., 2007), which included three items on the evaluators’ willingness to hire the employee and how much they would enjoy and benefit from working with her/him (α = .82).

The survey concluded with manipulation checks on the employee’s gender and whether s/he negotiated and with language-proficiency and demographic items. Language proficiency items included whether participants were more comfortable speaking in Arabic or English (7-point scale: 7 = much more in English) and whether they attended private school (English instruction) before university, which interviewees emphasized was a distinguishing factor in university students’ English language proficiency.

**Results and Discussion**

**Participant gender.** We observed no significant effects of participant gender, so we removed that variable from the analysis.

**Language proficiency.** Participants reported feeling more comfortable speaking in Arabic than English (M difference from mid-point = -1.04, t[392] = 12.33, p < .001), but women less so than men (M difference = .55, t[391] = 3.04, p = .003). Men reported attending private preparatory school more frequently than women (male P = .23, female P = .13, χ²[1, N = 393] = 7.00, p = .008). We used these
variables as controls in our analyses.

**Manipulation checks.** Participants were significantly likely to correctly identify the employee’s gender ($\chi^2[1, N = 391] = 309.61, p < .001$ [two nonresponses] and whether the employee negotiated ($\chi^2[1, N = 392] = 160.66, p < .001$ [one nonresponse]).

**Dependent measure: The social cost of negotiating.** Our general analytic strategy was to examine how employee gender and global/local work culture influence the social cost of negotiating for higher compensation. We measured the social cost of negotiating in terms of the difference between evaluators’ willingness to work with the employee in the no-negotiate as compared to the negotiate condition. In the other words, if evaluators were less willingness to work with the employee in the negotiate than no-negotiate condition, then that would indicate that the employee paid a social cost for negotiating because all else was held equal.

We designed the experiment to conduct a comparative “within-gender” analysis of the effects of negotiating for higher pay (i.e., female national [no-negotiate M – negotiate M] versus male national [no-negotiate M – negotiate M]) because research shows that “across-gender” comparisons (e.g., female national [no-negotiate M] versus male national [no-negotiate M]) may be difficult to interpret due to “shifting standards” (Biernat, 2003; Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991). When evaluators make subjective assessments of men and women in the absence of an explicit comparison standard, they are likely to mentally compare male targets to other men and female targets to other women.

For instance, Biernat and Vescio (2002) provide the example of a man and woman playing together on a softball team. If the man and woman were equally good players, evaluators might independently rate the man as “average” but the woman as “excellent” because a woman who is as good as an average man is excellent for a woman. Still, because evaluators believe that men are better performers than women, they are likely to choose the “average” man over the “excellent” woman if asked, “which of the two should you choose if your primary objective were to win the game?”

This “shifting standards” problem applies to our “willingness to work” measure because, in the Arab Gulf, fewer women than men hold management positions in the private sector. Comparing the social
cost of negotiating for females to the social cost of negotiating for males evades potential distortions in the baseline analyses of men and women (e.g., “she looks like a great management candidate—for a woman”). In this way, we minimize distortions created by “shifting standards” (Biernat et al., 1991).

We used ANCOVA to test our hypotheses about the moderating effects of employee gender and global/local work culture on the social costs of negotiating for higher compensation, controlling for participants’ Arabic/English language proficiency. Table 1 summarizes results of ANCOVA of the willingness to work with the employee by employee gender, global/local work culture, and negotiate (yes/no) conditions, controlling for the participants’ language proficiency. Table 2 displays estimated marginal means by condition. We observed main effects for global/local work culture, $F(1, 383) = 14.90, p < .001, \eta^2 = .04$, and negotiate, $F(1, 383) = 26.86, p < .001, \eta^2 = .07$, indicating more favorable evaluations in the local than global work culture and when the employee did not negotiate. These main effects were qualified by a three-way interaction of Gender × Global/Local × Negotiate, $F(1, 383) = 5.53, p = .02, \eta^2 = .01$.

Table 3 displays the decomposition of this three-way interaction, testing effects of Gender × Negotiate in the global and local work cultures and testing effects of Global/Local × Negotiate for male and female nationals. Figure 2 illustrates the decomposition of the three-way interaction effect by displaying the social cost of negotiating (i.e., estimated marginal mean differences in willingness to work: no-negotiate minus negotiate) by employee gender and cultural context.

As predicted for the local work culture, employee gender significantly moderated the effect of negotiating on evaluators’ willingness to work with the employee, $F(1, 224) = 5.62, p = .02, \eta^2 = .02$. As depicted in Figure 2, female nationals incurred a significant social cost for negotiating in the local work culture, $F(1, 117) = 18.64, p < .001, \eta^2 = .14$, but not male nationals, $F(1, 105) = 0.86, p = .36, \eta^2 < .01$. In the global work culture, evaluators penalized male and female nationals for negotiating, $F(1, 159) = 15.48, p < .001, \eta^2 = .09$ (no-negotiate estimated marginal $M = 5.70, SE = .12$; negotiate estimated marginal $M = 4.98, SE = .13$).

The interaction of Global/Local × Negotiate was significant for male nationals, $F(1, 186) = 4.09,$
Anticipated Status Decline

$p < .05, \eta^2 = .02$, but not female nationals, $F(1, 195) = 2.06, p = .15, \eta^2 = .01$. As depicted in Figure 2, evaluators penalized male nationals for negotiating in the global work culture, $F(1, 79) = 13.38, p < .001, \eta^2 = .15$, but not in the local, $F(1, 105) = 0.86, p = .36, \eta^2 < .01$. Evaluators penalized female negotiators in both contexts, $F(1, 197) = 15.82, p < .001, \eta^2 < .07$ (no-negotiate estimated marginal $M = 5.93, SE = .12$; negotiate estimated marginal $M = 5.25, SE = .12$).

Mediation analyses. To test for our hypothesized mediation effects, we used bootstrapping procedures advised by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) to test the statistical significance of the indirect effect (i.e., the path from the independent variable through the mediator to the dependent variable). Bootstrapping is appropriate because our independent variables are dichotomous and we do not have a very large sample size. Therefore, we are unlikely to meet the assumption of the Sobel test that the product of the coefficients along the path of the indirect effect has a normal distribution (Sobel, 1982).

Figures 3 and 4 illustrate our mediation effects following Baron & Kenney’s logical deduction of mediation effects (Baron & Kenney, 1986). Figure 3 follows Preacher et al.’s (2007) models of conditional indirect effects (see Model 2 of mediated moderation, p. 194). Figure 4 follows Preacher and Hayes’ (2008) multiple-mediator model (p. 881).

For male nationals, we hypothesized that there would be a greater social cost associated with negotiating in the global than local work culture. We hypothesized that male nationals negotiating for higher compensation in the global work culture would violate expectations of low-status behavior. Therefore, we predicted that a lack of perceived communality—which, as described above, is a low-status behavioral profile—would explain the greater social costs for male nationals negotiating in the global (vs. local) work culture.

We tested for mediated moderation based on the significance of the indirect path from the Global/Local × Negotiate interaction through communal to the willingness to work with a male employee, controlling for participants’ language proficiency. For both values of the work-culture moderator (i.e., local and global), we bootstrapped the distribution of the product of the coefficients (i.e., $a*b$ in Figure 3).
and calculated the 95-percent confidence interval for this indirect effect. The confidence intervals did not transgress zero, indicating that the test of moderated mediation was significant (local bias-corrected 95% CI = [-.41, -.08]; global bias-corrected 95% CI = -.60, -.16). As predicted, these mediation results indicate that evaluators penalized male nationals for negotiating for higher compensation in the global work culture because they perceived them as insufficiently communal. In contrast, male nationals incurred no penalty for negotiating for higher compensation in the local work culture.

Work culture did not moderate the social costs to female nationals for negotiating for higher compensation; female nationals were penalized for negotiating in both work cultures. As documented in U.S. studies (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 2007), we hypothesized that a perceived violation of the norms of communality would explain evaluators’ disinclination to work with female negotiators. Within the specific cultural context of the Arab Gulf, we hypothesized further that women would pay a social cost for negotiating because they would appear immodest and materialistic. Immodest and materialistic were not candidates for mediation of the effect of Global/Local × Negotiate on the willingness to work with male nationals, because the Global/Local × Negotiate interaction had no significant effect on the perceived immodesty or materialism of male nationals (βs < 0.13, ps > .22).

Following Preacher and Hayes (2008), we tested the multiple-mediation model depicted in Figure 4. As compared to testing each potential mediator individually, multiple mediation has the advantages of testing for an overall mediation effect and of making more transparent the extent to which each potential mediator contributes to the overall effect. We tested for mediation based on the significance of the indirect paths from negotiate through the three potential mediators (i.e., communal, immodest, materialistic) to the willingness to work with a female employee, controlling for participants’ language proficiency. We bootstrapped the distribution of the product of the a and b coefficients in Figure 4 (e.g., \(a_1 * b_1\)) and calculated the 95-percent confidence interval of the indirect effect through each mediator. The confidence intervals did not transgress zero, indicating that the mediation tests were significant (communal bias-corrected 95% CI = [-.32, -.05]; immodest bias-corrected 95% CI = [-.32, -.05]; materialistic bias-adjusted 95% CI = [-.55, -.05]). As predicted, these mediation results indicate that
evaluators penalized female nationals for negotiating for higher compensation because negotiating made the women appear less communal, more immodest, and more materialistic than when they did not.

**Discussion**

The results of Study 2 supported our predictions and mirrored the results of Study 1. In the local work culture, female nationals paid a greater social cost than male nationals for negotiating for higher compensation. There were no significant social costs associated with male nationals negotiating for higher pay in the local work culture. However, there were significant social costs associated with male national negotiating in the global work culture.

Mediation analyses revealed that evaluators were disinclined to work with male negotiators in the global work culture because negotiating made them appear less communal—a characteristic antithetical to the global market culture but prescribed of lower-status group members. This pattern of results is consistent with the proposition that male nationals’ decreased social status moving from the local to the global work culture inhibits their propensity to negotiate for career rewards. The results of Study 2 also offer an explanation for male nationals’ greater reticence in Study 1 to negotiate when primed for a global (as compared to local) work culture.

Work culture did not moderate the negative effect of negotiating on the willingness to work with female nationals. As hypothesized for both work contexts, evaluators were disinclined to work with female national who negotiated for higher pay because they perceived them as lacking in communality, immodest, and materialistic. These findings replicate and extend to a new cultural context the basic pattern of results reported in U.S.-based studies of the social costs for women of negotiating for themselves for higher compensation (Amanatullah & Morris, 2010; Bowles et al., 2007). The reported perceptions of immodesty and materialism also highlight the value for psychologists in exploring some of the subtleties in how gender is socially constructed across national and organizational contexts (e.g., Alvesson & Billing, 1997; Brownell & Wasserstrom, 2002; Bruni & Gherardi, 2004).

**General Discussion**

In this research, we explore experimentally the psychological experience of the global job market
for nationals in emerging economies. We present mirror studies in which global-local bi-cultural job candidates engaged in work scenarios as employees and evaluators of employee in the local and global job markets. The results of these studies support the proposition that male nationals experience diminished social status in the global (versus local) business cultures in ways that could inhibit their pursuit of career rewards. Priming the global (versus local) work culture, we observed that male nationals were more reticent to negotiate for higher compensation and were evaluated were more negatively when they did. The mediating factor that explained why participants evaluated national men more negatively for negotiating in the global (versus local) work culture was a failure to conform to prescriptive norms of low-status behavior, specifically communality (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Conway et al., 1996; Jackman, 1994).

Similar to findings from U.S. studies, we found that women in the Arab Gulf were more reticent than men to negotiate for higher compensation in the local business culture (Bowles, 2013). This finding extends U.S. research findings to a novel cultural context. We also found that participants negatively evaluated women for negotiating because it made them seem immodest and materialistic—not only because they violated expectations of communality, as the in the U.S. studies. There were no gender differences in the propensity to negotiate or in the social costs of negotiating in the global business context.

This research contributes a novel experimental perspective to qualitative explorations of global-local status hierarchies in multi-national employment contexts (e.g., Aneesh, 2012; Metiu, 2006; T. B. Neeley, 2013). Our experimental methods have weaknesses relative to field-based observational methods. For instance, we have no direct observations of status-linked social behaviors in actual workplace interactions. However, by illuminating the psychological experience for “locals” shifting between local and global business cultures, we add another dimension to our collective understanding of the lived experience of workplace globalization. As Chatman and Flynn (2005) have argued in favor of “full-cycle” organizational research, it is “by combining observational and experimental methods in a continual recursive pattern, [that] robust findings that offer causality, relevance, and generalizability may emerge
Our research is among the first to explore empirically the psychological experience of global-local bi-culturalism for nationals in a globalizing workplace (cf., Gillespie et al., 2010). Traditionally, studies of bicultural identities have focused on biculturalism developed through immigration or minority ethnic status (e.g., Berry, 1993, 1997; Phinney, 1990; Phinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997). It is important to illuminate the experiences of “locals” at the boundaries of economic globalization, because their perspective is different from and must eventually be integrated with the perspective of those extending their global reach into local regions (Erez & Gati, 2004).

It is psychologically challenging for bicultural individuals to shift between opposing cultural meaning systems (Adler, 1977; Chen, Benet-Martinez, & Bond, 2008). As discussed above, Western values tend to predominate in global business cultures. If organizational scholars and global managers fail to actively engage with the lived experience of global-local biculturalism and global-local status hierarchies in the multi-national workplaces, we risk mindlessly institutionalizing Western privilege (Arnett, 2002; Chiu et al, 2011) and constraining the potential to leverage local talent.

Implications for Research on Status in Global Business Employment

One direction for future research would be to explore the extent to which our findings with global-local biculturals in the Arab Gulf extend to other parts of the world in which local employees are attempting to integrate themselves into the global labor market. For instance, the patterns we observe might more closely align with experiences of economic globalization in Latin American and in South/South East Asia than with parts of East Asia (e.g., the “Asian Tigers”) where nationals claim credit for homegrown global economic ascendance (e.g., see qualitative studies by Erez & Gati, 2004; Gillespie et al., 2010). A deeper understanding of socioeconomic factors that moderate the psychological experience and challenges global-local biculturalism would advance theory and practice (Aneesh, 2012; Erez & Gati, 2004).

In the spirit of the “full-cycle” research (referenced above), another important direction for this research would be to test implications of our findings in multi-national employment contexts. In
particular, we never compare directly in this research the psychological experience of employment negotiations for expat and national workers. Through field research in multinational corporations, one could explore through qualitative and survey methods how global-local status hierarchies among employees influence the potential for self-advocacy for career rewards and opportunities. In this research we focus narrowly on compensation because it is broadly relevant and recognized subject of career negotiation. Another example documented in qualitative and case research is negotiation for creative vs. technical work assignments that are more professionally gratifying and career enhancing (e.g., see Fu & Chiu, 2007). The psychological experience and results of and strategies for career negotiations in global employment contexts could all be subjects of future research.

**Implications for Research on Gender and Status in Negotiation**

Finally, this research has explored intersections of gender and culture that are rarely traversed in psychological research (Stewart & McDermott, 2004). There are many theoretical reasons to believe that results observed in the U.S. studies of gender in negotiation—or psychological effects of gender on the enactment and evaluation of work practices more broadly (Arnett, 2002; Eytan, 2004)—would travel to other national contexts because the basic social structure of gender relations replicates across so many cultures. It is well established that gendered norms of behavior reflect men’s and women’s work roles and hierarchical place in society (Metiu, 2006; T. Neeley & DeLong, 2009). There is not a country in the world today in which women control more economic wealth and command more institutional authority than men (for a review, see Eagly & Carli, 2007).

However, we also understand that gender effects on social behavior are fundamentally contextual, reflective of the “distal” influences of the social structure of gender relations but also of “proximal” cues embedded in the specific situation of interaction (Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Glick et al., 2000; Jackman, 1994). As we explore more deeply how culture and intersecting social identities inform “gender belief systems” (Hausmann, Tyson, & Zahidi, 2010), we will have more opportunities to test the boundary conditions of documented gender effects and to develop our theories about gender as a distinctive form of social status (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998; Deaux & Major, 1987).
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Appendix

Multi-Item Measures Created for Studies 1 and 2

Study 1

**Wasta**
- I would need the recommendation of wasta in this job situation.
- I would need a connection to get this job.
- I would only get offered a job through wasta.
- Wasta is only way to secure job offer in such a situation.

Study 2

**Communal**
- Hamad/Hamda clearly cares about relationships.
- Hamad/Hamda puts people first.
- Hamad/Hamda enjoys working with other people.
- Having good relationships with colleagues is important to Hamad/Hamda.
- Hamad/Hamda talks too much. (Arabic expression; reverse coded)

**Immodest**
- Hamad/Hamda is modest. (reverse coded)
- Hamad/Hamda displays the appropriate level of modesty. (reverse coded)
- Hamad/Hamda acted in an immodest manner.
- Hamad/Hamda is respectful toward his/her seniors. (reverse coded)
- Hamad/Hamda doesn’t know when to stop. (Arabic expression)

**Materialistic**
- Hamad/Hamda is materialistic.
- Hamad/Hamda is threatening to leave the company in order to get more money.
- Hamad/Hamda’s negotiating behavior is aggressive.
- Hamad/Hamda is pressuring the company to pay him/her more.
- Hamad/Hamda is giving up a lot on his/her demands. (reverse coded)
Table 1

Study 2: ANCOVA of Willingness to Work with Employee, Testing Effects of Global/Local Work Culture, Employee Gender, and Negotiate (Yes/No) Conditions and Controlling for Participants’ Arabic/English Language Proficiency (N = 393)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>(F)</th>
<th>(\eta^2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender of Employee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>&gt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global/Local Work Culture</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20.01</td>
<td>14.90*</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiate (Yes/No)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36.08</td>
<td>26.86**</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender × Global/Local</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender × Negotiate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global/Local × Negotiate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>&gt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender × Global/Local × Negotiate</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.42</td>
<td>5.53*</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfort in Arabic/English</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10.60</td>
<td>7.89**</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private High School</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7.22</td>
<td>5.37*</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Italics indicate controls for language proficiency.

\* \(p < .05\). \** \(p < .01\). \*** \(p < .001\).
Table 2

*Study 2: Estimated Marginal Mean Willingness to Work with Employee, Generated by ANCOVA (in Table 1) Testing Effects of Global/Local Work Culture, Employee Gender, and Negotiate (Yes/No) Conditions and Controlling for Participants’ Arabic/English Language Proficiency*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work Culture</th>
<th>Employee Gender</th>
<th>Male National</th>
<th>Female National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>No Negotiate</td>
<td>M 5.85&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>6.29&lt;sup&gt;†&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SE (.16)</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n 53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negotiate</td>
<td>M 5.65&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>5.34&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SE (.16)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n 56</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>No Negotiate</td>
<td>M 5.78&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>5.52&lt;sub&gt;b,c&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SE (.18)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n 43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Negotiate</td>
<td>M 4.92&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
<td>5.04&lt;sub&gt;b,d&lt;/sub&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SE (.18)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n 40</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Down columns, differing lettered subscripts indicate differences in estimated marginal means between the no-negotiate/negotiate or global/local conditions (<sup>ab</sup> p < .01; <sup>cd</sup> p = .06). The symbol † indicates a significant gender difference within condition at level of p < .05.
Anticipated Status Decline

Table 3

Study 2: ANCOVA of Willingness to Work with Employee, Testing Effects of Employee Gender and Negotiate Conditions Separately within Global versus Local Work Culture and Testing Effects of Global versus Local Work Culture and Negotiate Conditions Separately for Male and Female Nationals and Controlling for Participants’ Arabic/English Language Proficiency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work Culture</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Global</th>
<th>Local</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>$MS$</td>
<td>$F(1, 157)$</td>
<td>$\eta^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee Gender</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiate: Yes/No</td>
<td>19.89</td>
<td>15.30***</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender × Negotiate</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfort in Arabic/English</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private High School</td>
<td>9.95</td>
<td>7.66**</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employee</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Male National</th>
<th>Female National</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>$MS$</td>
<td>$F(1, 186)$</td>
<td>$\eta^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global/Local Work Culture</td>
<td>7.77</td>
<td>5.81*</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiate: Yes/No</td>
<td>14.24</td>
<td>10.65***</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global/Local × Negotiate</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>4.09*</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfort in Arabic/English</td>
<td>8.04</td>
<td>6.02*</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private High School</td>
<td>8.92</td>
<td>6.67*</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Italics indicate controls for language proficiency. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. 


Figure 1. Study 1: Graphic displays male and female nationals’ mean propensity to initiate negotiation in the global and local work culture (±1 SE). Asterisk indicates that male nationals’ propensity to negotiate in the local work culture was significantly higher than the propensity to negotiate in any other conditions at the level $p \leq .01$. 
Figure 2. Study 2: Graphic displays estimated marginal mean differences (controlling for language proficiency) between the no-negotiate and negotiate conditions in the willingness to work with male and female nationals (i.e., social cost of negotiating) in the global and local work cultures (±1 SE).
Figure 3. Model of mediated moderation adapted from Preacher and Rucker (2007, Model 2, p. 194), showing that a perceived lack of communality explains why male nationals pay a higher social cost (i.e., negative effect of negotiating on evaluators’ willingness to work with them) in the global than local work culture. All regressions included controls for participants’ language proficiency. The emboldened path from $a$ through $b$ depicts the conditional indirect effect. Coefficients labeled $c$ and $c'$ compare the effect of the independent variable with ($c'$) and without ($c$) the mediators included in the model.
Figure 4. Model of multiple mediation adapted from Preacher and Hayes (2008, p. 881), showing that a perceived lack of communality as well as perceived immodesty and materialism explain why evaluators were disinclined to work with female nationals who negotiated for higher compensation. All regressions included controls for participants’ language proficiency. Paths $a$ through $b$ (e.g., $a_1*b_1$) depict the indirect effect of each mediator. Coefficients labeled $c$ and $c'$ compare the effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable with ($c'$) and without ($c$) the mediators included in the model.